DEGLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIBENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2008

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1. The attached papers ([ ]   Memoranda for the Record, 28, 30, and 30 January and (EOSSEAHN Memorandum G-176) will, we hope, serve to allay fears of a major operational security situation in the Dr. Willi HORTIL - CC 2 relationship, Although final decision will be reserved pending the transcription in Vienna of the technically unsatisfactory interrogation recordings and a possible CARMIAGE setting of CC 2 in March, we feel safe in opining that no serious security damage was done (EOSSEAHN by the HOETIL relationship. We also concur in [ ]; conclusion on the beads of available evidence that CC 2 was not a viper at (EOSSEAHN's breast, but, rather, an exceptionally naive person who, through Providence alone, avdded doing our interests serious harm. Although we do not as yet have the benefit of the transcribed interrogation and a final CARMIAGE test, we have discussed the interrogations exhaustively — during their progress and fellowing their completion — with both [ ] and CEOSSEAHN.  2. In view of what we are at the present inclined to view as alight damage done us by the HOETIL affair, we regard the lesson CHOSSEAHN — and we — have learned from it as outwighing any harm done. This incident appears to have blown a draft of uncomfortably cold air though the last chink of CHOSSEAHN's "I-know-my-people-thoroughly-and-ma-an-infallible-master-of-psychology-in-these-matters" armore. CHOSSEAHN, quite humanly, we believe, would have been less embarrassed had CC 2 turned out to be a cold-biooded penetration agent of HOETIL's than he was to discover that CC 2 was a reasonably honorable little guy who didn't tell (CHOSSEAHN much that he should have known simply because (CHOSSEAHN was aloof, chilly, and manifested no professional counter-intelligence interest (CHOSSEAHN makening was so midden and so complete finally that he spolegised verbally to [ ] for his apology in the final paragraph of G-176 because it [ ] for his apology in the final paragraph of G-176 because it [ ] for his apology in the final paragraph of G-176 beca	SPECIFIC	- Orossbahn - CC	2		
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did as pathent, sympathetic, and professional a job as we've seen for a long time. By his exceptionally competent briefing of himself, his establishment of immediate rapport with CROSSBAHN, and his astutely competent handling of the CC 2 interrogation, he appears to have transferred a sticky situation to the profit side of the ledger. We have learned something further about CROSSBAHN, CROSSBAHN has learned a great deal about control techniques, interrogation, and practical psychology, and CC 2 is apparently leaving Austria for a fairly important job in Germany with the feeling that if he ever had two friends they are CROSSBAHN and the United States Government,

Memoranda for the Record

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